

# Let's Make a Deal!

## The Monty Hall Problem

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## Game Theory

The study of interacting decisions of rational agents and how these strategies produce outcomes with respect to the utilities of the agents.

Assume...

- Players are *rational*

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Assume...

- Players are *rational*
- Players always have a set of preferences and always act in order to maximize these preferences

## Games

- situations in which players act and respond to each other with utility-maximizing strategies

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## Nash Equilibrium

- refers to whole strategies for each player that maximize the utility of every player

# Let's Make a Deal!

First Choice	Prize Door	Switch	Stay
1	1	L	W
1	2	W	L
1	3	W	L
2	1	W	L
2	2	L	W
2	3	W	L
3	1	W	L
3	2	W	L
3	3	L	W

Table: Should You Switch?

## The Contestant

- rational agent playing with the goal of winning the prize

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## The Host

- NOT a rational agent...  
playing with the same strategy every time and not maximizing his utility.



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## The Host

- a rational agent playing with a strategy to produce the most popular game show

## Playing Fair

The fair host always reveals a goat and allows contestants to switch.

- switching  $\implies P(\text{win}) = \frac{2}{3}$

## Playing Evil

The evil host only allows contestants to switch if they initially pick the prize.

- switching  $\implies P(\text{win}) = 0$

## Playing Fair

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- staying  $\implies P(\text{win}) = \frac{1}{3}$

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## Define Parameters

- $p$  = the frequency with which the host plays evil
- $q$  = the frequency with which the contestant will NOT switch when given the choice

## Mind Reading Host

The host reaches his highest utility when he can accurately predict your behavior and adjust his strategy accordingly.

- high  $q$  or initially picked prize  $\implies$  *fair*

## Lying Contestant

The contestant can try to trick the host by pretending to have a high  $q$  and then switching doors at the last moment.

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- $P(\text{win}) = \frac{q}{3} \leq \frac{1}{3}$
- $P(\text{open}) = P(\text{stay}) + P(\text{switch})P(\text{car}) = \frac{1+2q}{3}$

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Link to References: [https://docs.google.com/document/d/1NJ0qgb8TZdd31jMW8tWeP5G\\_wbnIGd1XaCHsh8Dhbzc/edit?usp=sharing](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1NJ0qgb8TZdd31jMW8tWeP5G_wbnIGd1XaCHsh8Dhbzc/edit?usp=sharing)